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Wright: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e): Spoiling the Spoliation Do

NOTE
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(e):
SPOILING THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE

I.

INTRODUCTION

It certainly cannot be debated that technology has brought about
profound change to all aspects of modem society. The legal world has
not been immune to the changes brought about by technology, nor to the
nuanced questions that have arisen in its wake. In particular, the
discovery process in litigation has been significantly impacted by the
rise of new technology. In fact, technology has had so momentous an
influence on the discovery process that the use of technology during the
discovery process has become a practice in and of itself, known today as
electronic discovery ("e-discovery").
In 2007, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") were
amended in an attempt to address the problematic issues associated with
e-discovery. 1 Most importantly, for purposes of this Note, the
amendments attempted to address the issue of the failure of a party to
produce documents requested in discovery because they have been
destroyed in conjunction with the use of an electronic information
system. Rule 37(e) of the FRCP was designed to create a "safe harbor"
for parties that have inadvertently destroyed documents requested in a
pending litigation. This safe harbor prohibits courts from sanctioning
parties who fail to produce documents "as a result of the routine, goodfaith operation of an electronic information system." 2

1. See Thomas Y. Allman, Rule 37() Meets Its Critics: The Justificationfor a Limited
Preservation Safe Harborfor ESI, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2006) (citing JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at Rules App. C-83, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/

Reports/ST09-2005.pdf).
2.

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
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At first glance, Rule 37(e) is a welcome addition to the Federal
Rules because of its attempt to alleviate the problem of inadvertent
document destruction resulting from use of a particular electronic
information system.3 However, Rule 37(e) must be considered in light of
the long recognized common law doctrine of spoliation of evidence,
whereby parties are sanctioned for the destruction of requested
documents during discovery. When analyzed against this backdrop, it
becomes clear that Rule 37(e) does little to efficiently ease the problems
associated with document destruction that occurs during electronic
discovery.
This Note posits that courts have interpreted and applied Rule 37(e)
in such a way that renders it inconsistent with the theoretical
underpinnings of the spoliation doctrine, as well as the stated purposes
of the FRCP; that is, that the Rules are to be "construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding." 5 Because Rule 37(e) has been
ineffective, it should be removed from the FRCP. Part II offers a brief
overview of the spoliation doctrine and the role it plays in discovery.
Part III is a discussion of the extensive role of electronic information
systems in discovery as well as the complications that this has caused for
parties. Part IV provides an analysis of Rule 37(e) and the "safe harbor"
provision that it creates. Finally, Part V is an overview of the impact of
Rule 37(e) on discovery. It argues that Rule 37(e) should be removed
from the FRCP, because the traditional spoliation doctrine is sufficient
for courts to impose sanctions on parties for violations of the discovery
process, and instead, the focus must shift to firmly establishing the
confines of the duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence.

3. See Allman, supra note 1, at 3. Note: An amendment, effective Dec. 1, 2007, restyled the
FRCP and relocated Rule 37(f) to 37(e). Gal Davidovitch, Comment, Why Rule 37(e) Does Not
Creole a New Safe Harborfor Electronic Evidence Spoliation, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1131, 1131
n.1 (2008). As such, references in the sources cited herein to Rule 37(f) refer to the current Rule
37(e).
4. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (defining
spoliation as "the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property
for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation").
5.

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE SPOLIATION DOCTRINE

A. Introduction
Spoliation is "[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or
concealment of evidence, usu[ally] a document." 6 The spoliation
doctrine is invoked when a party alleges that its opposing party has
caused a crucial piece of evidence to be unavailable.7 If an opposing
party is responsible for the destruction of relevant evidence, it is within
the trial court's discretion to impose sanctions on that party.
As a general rule, the trial court is afforded broad authority in its
determination as to which sanction is to be imposed on a party for
spoliation.9 To determine the severity of sanctions, the court weighs
several countervailing factors,10 one of which is the prejudice to the
opposing party resulting from the spoliation." This prejudice is regarded
as being more significant than other factors, most notably the state of
mind of a party alleged to have destroyed the documents. 12
FRCP 37(b)(2) explicitly authorizes courts to impose sanctions on a
party for failure to comply with a discovery order.' 3 This provision gives
courts the authority to sanction parties that destroy documents in direct
violation of a discovery order.14 The inherent authority of courts is also
recognized as an additional source of power for courts to impose
sanctions. 15 This enables courts to impose sanctions on those parties who
destroy evidence in contexts other than in direct violation of a discovery
order.' 6 The inherent power of the courts to sanction is limited by the
requirement that sanctions be imposed when a party acts in bad faith, in

6.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (8th ed. 2004).

7. E.g., Moghari v. Anthony Abraham Chevrolet Co., 699 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
8. See, e.g., Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995).
9. 27 C.J.S. Discovery § 182 (2009).
10. James T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals for New York State, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 1045, 1055 (2005).
11. Id. Other factors considered in determining sanctions include the "nature and significance
of the interests promoted by the actor's conduct,... the character of the means used by the actor;
and .. .the actor's motive." Id.
12. See Huhta v. Thermo King Corp., No. A03-1961, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 722, at *9-10
(Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 2004).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) ("If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing
agent . .. fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery .. .the court ... may issue further
just orders.").
14. Id
15. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-51 (1991).
16. Id at 45-46.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

796

[Vol. 38:793

order to allow the courts to "manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." 7
The spoliation doctrine interplays with the duty to preserve, a duty
which stems from the common law obligation to preserve evidence when
a party "has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a
party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to the future
litigation."18 Indeed, "a finding of spoliation is necessarily contingent
upon the determination that a litigant had the duty to preserve the
documents in question."' 9
The spoliation doctrine has generally been applied to punish those
parties who destroy relevant documents in bad faith.20 In essence, where
the duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence clearly exists, and that
duty is disregarded and consequently prevents the production of relevant
documents, the court sees fit to punish the party responsible for
destroying those documents.21 The rationale for this punishment is
rooted in the theory that the destruction of documents hinders the
discovery process and unfairly prejudices the requesting party because
potentially relevant evidence is unavailable to them due to the conduct
of their adversary.22 As such, the party in the wrong must be held
accountable for its actions.23
B.

The Duty to Preserve Under the Spoliation Doctrine

A party's duty to preserve potentially relevant documents is
paramount to understanding the spoliation doctrine.24 The concept of
spoliation springs from the presumption that the documents at issue were
destroyed when litigation was either pending or reasonably

17. Id. at43, 49 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
18. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
19. Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying
TraditionalDoctrines of Spoliation to ElectronicDiscovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 19 (2006);
see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("It goes without
saying that a party can only be sanctioned for destroying evidence if it had a duty to preserve it.").
20. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 15.
21. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The concept of the "duty to preserve" is founded on the idea that parties to litigation are
required to preserve documents or other materials that may be requested as potential evidence
during the discovery process. See, e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th
Cir. 1994); Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (1Ith Cir.
2003). This duty is long standing, widely recognized, and established in federal law. See Fujitsu
Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271
F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
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foreseeable.25 It is this context, where litigation has commenced, or can
26
be expected to commence, that gives rise to the duty to preserve.
When a complaint has been filed, the duty to preserve is
unquestionably imposed on parties. 27 The filing of the complaint
provides the parties with express notice that documents that are relevant
to that litigation must be preserved, simply by virtue of the fact that
litigation has commenced.2 8 Once pleadings are filed, it is presumed that
because parties have been given notice of the issues to be litigated, it is
within reason that the parties are, or ought to be, aware of what
information and what sorts of documents may be categorized as relevant
29
at later stages of the litigation, and most notably, during discovery.
Beyond the obvious situation where a party is put on notice to
preserve potential evidence by the initiation of litigation through the
filing of a complaint, it is well established that "[t]he duty to preserve
evidence is triggered when an organization reasonably anticipates
litigation."3 o Courts have held that reasonable anticipation of litigation is
based on the occurrence of "significant signs of imminent litigation prior
to the filing of a complaint" and have only imposed a duty to preserve
evidence on a party "when the signs are clear." 31 This duty is assessed
by the relevance of potential evidence in light of the foreseeability of
potential litigation, from the perspective of a reasonable person.32
To date, courts have not agreed on a bright line rule for when these
"significant signs," which trigger the duty to preserve, exist.33 However,
some commonly recognized signs of imminent litigation are
communication with adverse parties and/or their counsel prior to the
commencement of litigation,3 4 the existence of litigation between other,
25. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d at 779 (defining spoliation as "the destruction or
significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in
pending or reasonablyforeseeable litigation" (emphasis added)).
26. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
27. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 168-70 (D.
Colo. 1990) (sanctioning a default judgment issued against a party that knowingly destroyed
evidence after a litigation between the parties had commenced).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
29. See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of
Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006).
30. E.g., China Ocean Shipping Co. v. Simone Metals, Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16264, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) ("The duty to preserve evidence includes any
relevant evidence over which the non-preserving entity had control and reasonably knew or could
reasonably foresee was material to a potential legal action.").
31. Crist, supranote 29, at 18.
32. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995).
33. Crist, supra note 29, at 18 ("Courts are not in agreement as to when a party should be
charged with sufficient notice of a claim to trigger the preservation obligation.").
34. See Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (C.D. Cal.
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non-related parties based on the same subject matter as contained in the
destroyed documents,3 5 an investigation into a party's actions, 6 and the
filing of a complaint by an adverse party with a government agency.3 7
Thus, the duty to preserve is an affirmative duty imposed on parties
to refrain from destroying documents, tapes, and the like where it is
reasonably foreseeable that they may be requested in discovery. It is
the breach of this duty to preserve potentially material information that
invokes application of the spoliation doctrine based on the actions of the
party that destroyed these kinds of documents and allows courts to
impose sanctions for the violation of the duty.39
C.

Sanctionsfor Spoliation

The consequences of a party's violation of its duty to preserve may
be far-reaching. At its most basic level, spoliation by a party has a
negative impact not only on a particular litigation, but on the justice
system as a whole.4 o Spoliation strikes at the heart of the most
fundamental assumptions that underlie the American justice system, as it
"undermines the efficacy of the adversarial system" because it "prevents
a party from adequately proving or defending a claim at trial." 4 1
In order to combat and deter spoliation, courts have the discretion
to impose sanctions against parties that destroy potentially relevant
documents.4 2 These sanctions are to be imposed in light of three
underlying purposes: deterrence from engaging in spoliation,
1984) (stating that a notice of the duty to preserve was triggered by pre-litigation communications
between counsel for the parties).
35. United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., 197 F.R.D. 463, 482 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (noting
that a party that destroyed documents had a duty to preserve documents and tapes based on prior
litigation between other parties on the same subject matter as was contained in the destroyed
documents).
36. E*TRADE Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 589 (D. Minn. 2005) (noting
that the duty to preserve potentially relevant documents arose when party received notice that a
potentially fraudulent loan scheme was being investigated by a bankruptcy court).
37. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the
duty to preserve potentially relevant documents was triggered when an employee filed an
employment discrimination charge with the EEOC).
38. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of pre-trial discovery requests as "any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action" so long as it appears to be "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"). Thus, documents that are destroyed fit
within this standard, and may lead to the imposition of sanctions for spoliation.
39. See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 168 (D. Colo.
1990).
40. See Crist, supra note 29, at 43 ("The American justice system is premised on the fair
adjudication of disputes through both sides obtaining and presenting the relevant evidence.").
41. Killelea, supranote 10, at 1046.
42. See E*TRADE Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 586 (D. Minn. 2005).
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punishment for a wrongful act, and remediation.4 3 Each of these
purposes attempts to cure the prejudice that resulted to the injured party
as a consequence of the spoliation by its adversary.4
Sanctions for spoliation, and the circumstances under which they
are imposed, vary across jurisdictions.4 5 However, after establishing that
the duty to preserve has been breached, courts traditionally make the
determination as to whether sanctions are warranted based on the threepart test set forth in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp.46 In
Schmid, the Third Circuit held that sanctions should be imposed based
on "the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the
evidence; .. . the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party;
and ... whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial
unfairness to the opposing party."47 Additionally, in particularly serious
situations, courts also consider whether the sanctions are likely to deter
future parties from similar conduct.48
Once a court determines that some sort of sanction is warranted for
a party's destruction of documents,4 9 that court has "broad authority" to
impose a sanction which sufficiently implements the established
underpinnings of the spoliation doctrine.o Courts are afforded this broad
authority in order to enable them to "level[] the evidentiary playing field
and ... sanction[] the improper conduct."51 It has been held that
sanctions ought to be imposed so that the underlying purposes of the
spoliation doctrine are served, while at the same time, crafting the least
drastic sanction available. The imposition of sanctions is reviewed by
higher courts for abuse of discretion, and absent such abuse, sanctions
will be upheld.53

43. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
44. Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995).
45. Killelea, supra note 10, at 1046.
46. 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994).
47. Id.; see also Crist, supra note 29, at 44 ("To determine whether sanctions are warranted,
federal courts generally follow the three part test outlined in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool
Corp .... ).
48. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79; Crist, supra note 29, at 44.
49. See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that a
finding that a sanction is warranted for destruction of documents is contingent upon a finding of
prejudice to the opposite party).
50. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[A] district court has
broad discretion in choosing an appropriate sanction for spoliation. . . ."); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
37(b)(2) (authorizing court imposed sanctions for violations of discovery orders).
51. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
52. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Am. Automatic Sprinkler Sys., Inc., 201 F.3d 538, 543-44 (4th
Cir. 2000).
53. Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1993).
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While a wide range of sanctions may be-and have-been imposed
by the courts, "[lt]he most frequent sanctions for the destruction of
evidence include fines and adverse inference jury instructions."54 Other
common sanctions include dismissal of a claim, issue preclusion, or
summary judgment for the party prejudiced by the destruction of
evidence.55 While a court is not necessarily required to impose the "least
onerous" sanction available, the sanction that a court chooses to impose
must be the most appropriate under the circumstances of the particular
case56 and must be necessary in order to redress abuse to the judicial
system caused by the destruction of documents by a party.s?
D.

Crafting Sanctionsfor Spoliation of Evidence

Trial courts have broad discretion in the imposition of sanctions for
spoliation of evidence, and must craft those sanctions in an effort to
redress abuses to the justice system by the party that caused the
documents to be destroyed.
As a general rule, the sanctions imposed on a party that destroys
potentially relevant documents are based on a variety of factors,59 and
depend largely on the degree of prejudice resulting to the opposing party
as a consequence of the destroying party's conduct.60 When imposing a
sanction on a party responsible for the destruction of potentially relevant
documents, courts seek to fulfill the purposes of sanctions,61 while at the
same time, selecting the least onerous sanction, balanced against the
"willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice suffered by the
VitM,,62
victim."6

54. Crist, supra note 29, at 43 (footnote omitted); see also Killelea, supra note 10, at 1056.
When an adverse inference instruction is imposed as a sanction against a party, the court "instructs
the jury to presume that destroyed evidence, if produced, would have been adverse to the party that
destroyed it." Id.
55. Killelea, supra note 10, at 1052; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (listing sanctions
available for the court to impose in the event of a violation of a discovery order).
56. Keefer v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 238 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2000).
57. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (noting that the power of the
courts to impose sanctions is limited to that necessary to redress conduct "which abuses the judicial
process").
58. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.
59. See Killelea, supra note 10, at 1055 (noting that courts typically attempt to balance a
number of factors in determining appropriate sanctions).
60. See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
imposition of sanctions against a party for destroying documents is only merited when the other
party is able to demonstrate that they have suffered prejudice as a result of the destruction of
evidentiary materials).
61. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
62.

JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
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In crafting sanctions for spoliation, there is significant attention
paid to the prejudicial effect of the destructive act on the innocent
party.63 When a court makes the determination as to which sanction to
impose on a spoliating party, it must keep in mind that, absent a
sanction, "a spoliating party would obtain an unfair advantage and unlevel playing field when prosecuting or defending its case." 64 Thus, in
crafting sanctions, the desired result of the court should be to place the
prejudiced party back in the position it would have been, absent the
spoliation.65
Sanctions for spoliation are not dependent on a particular state of
mind at the time of the act that destroyed the documents.66 That is, the
application of sanctions does not require a finding of bad faith on the
part of the party responsible for destroying the documents at issue in a
particular case.67 Instead, it is the relationship between the degree of
prejudice suffered by the innocent party and the mindset of the
responsible party when engaging in the destructive acts that is
controlling in the imposition of spoliation sanctions on a party.68 These
countervailing factors are balanced in order to determine an appropriate
sanction in particular circumstances.69
The rationale for this methodology is based on the theory that if a
party is willing to take the risk of getting caught and sanctioned by the
court for destroying relevant documents or other materials, the inference
may be drawn that these destroyed documents are likely to harm that
63. Daniel Renwick Hodgman, Comment, A Port in the Storm?: The Problematic and
Shallow Safe Harborfor Electronic Discovery, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 259, 273 (2007) ("[E]videntiary
sanctions are predominantly compensatory, allowing courts to 'level the playing field' when one
party destroys evidence that circumstances suggest would aid the non-spoliating party's case.").
64. Id at 272; see also Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 284, 291 (E.D. Va.
2001) (finding that the U.S. government's failure to preserve certain documents relating to
communication between experts and consultants materially prejudiced the plaintiffs ability to
cross-examine witnesses).
65. Trigon Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. at 287.
66. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2002)
("[D]iscovery sanctions ... may be imposed upon a party that has breached a discovery obligation
not only through bad faith or gross negligence, but also through ordinary negligence."); see also
Hodgman, supra note 63, at 273 ("[C]ourts generally grant evidentiary sanctions regardless of the
spoliating party's state of mind; the evidence can be missing due to negligent, intentional or reckless
conduct.").
67. Although a finding of bad faith on the part of the destructing party is not necessary, "it is
definitely the primary factor to consider in weighing the appropriateness of the instruction."
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24068, at *22
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997).
68. See Killelea, supranote 10, at 1058 ("[A]s the culpability of the spoliating party decreases
(from intent to innocence), so too does the appeal of the punitive and deterrent purpose underlying
the [sanction].").
69. Trigon Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. at 286, 288.
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party's case. 70 The balancing of culpability against resultant prejudice in
relation to application of sanctions is especially important in the context
of the adverse inference instruction sanction, 7' which is considered to be
the most common sanction for spoliation.72 Generally, this particular
sanction will only be imposed on a party as a consequence of a bad faith,
intentional act." An adverse inference instruction permits the court to
allow the jury to make the inference that the destructive action was
undertaken in order to suppress the truth or purposely keep damaging
evidence out of the hands of an opposing party.74
For example, in Wiginton v. Ellis,5 an adverse inference instruction
was imposed against a party based on the trial court's determination that
the party acted in bad faith in its destruction of relevant documents.7 6
The trial court determined that
the facts surrounding the destruction of the documents are evidence
that [the party] knew that it had a duty to preserve relevant documents.
Its failure to change its normal document retention policy, knowing
that relevant documents would be destroyed if it did not act to preserve
these documents, is evidence of bad faith.77

70. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoilate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for
Vigorous JudicialAction, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 793, 795-96 (1991) ("The risk of being caught
suppressing evidence clearly depends on the particular type of evidence and the particular
circumstances of the case."); see also Trigon Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. at 284 (quoting Anderson v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 866 F. Supp. 937, 945 (E.D. Va. 1994)).
71. When an adverse inference instruction is given by a judge to the jury, the jury is
permitted, although not required, to assume that the destroyed evidence would have been
unfavorable to the destructing party's case. E.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d
Cir. 1998); see also Crist, supra note 29, at 47 ("In determining whether the [adverse] inference
[instruction] should be awarded, a key consideration is the level of culpability of the party
responsible for the destruction.").
72. See supratext accompanying note 54.
73. Courts should look to the facts surrounding the destruction of documents to determine if
they support an inference of bad faith. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
695 F.2d 253, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1982). "Bad faith" destruction of documents means that documents
were destroyed "for the purpose of hiding adverse information." Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc.,
136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998). Additionally, a determination that a party acted in bad faith
depends, in large part, on a breach of the duty to preserve relevant information. See id.
74. See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating
the general proposition that an adverse inference instruction is appropriate where evidence was
destructed intentionally, indicating fraud or a desire to hide the truth); Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester,
Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (the context in which to apply an adverse instruction inference
arises only where the destruction of evidence was intentional and motivated by some sort of
fraudulent intent, and the sanction ought not apply in a context absent some such intent).
75. No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003).
76. Id. at *21-23.
77. Id. at *23-24.
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Thus, it is clear that in imposing sanctions against a party for
spoliation, the court focuses on placing the prejudiced party back in the
evidentiary position it would have been in, but for the opposing party's
actions. 78 However, at the same time, sanctions must be imposed in such
a way to serve the "evidentiary, prophylactic, punitive, and remedial
rationales" underlying spoliation sanctions.79
III. FROM CUTTING EDGE TO COMMONPLACE: THE RISE IN THE
PREVALENCE OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION AND
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

A. From Paperinto Thin Air: The ProminentUse ofElectronic
Information Systems
The changes that technology has brought to society, especially in
the last half of the twentieth century, cannot be understated. While this
certainly has resulted in numerous benefits to society and increased
efficiency in many areas, many perplexing issues have arisen, especially
those surrounding e-discovery.80 The use of electronic information
systems has created issues in discovery regarding the deletion of
documents stored in such systems, as well as issues surrounding the
questions raised by the information contained in metadata.
78. Skeete v. McKinsey & Co., No. 91 Civ. 8093, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9099, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1993) (recognizing that a sanction should serve the function of restoration of the
prejudiced party to the position it would have been in had the spoliation not occurred).
79. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
80. See, e.g., Robert D. Brownstone, Preserve or Perish; Destroy or Drown-eDiscovery
Morphs Into Electronic Information Management,8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2006) ("[O1ver the past
few years, some unique electronic information issues-such as preservation obligations and costshifting-have increasingly crept into civil litigation.").
81. See id. at 2; see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT
RETENTION & PROD. (WGl), THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (2d ed. 2007), available at

http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCPRINCP_2nded_607.pdf [hereinafter
SEDONA PRINCIPLES]. Metadata is defined as:
Data typically stored electronically that describes characteristics of ESI, found in
different places in different forms. Can be supplied by applications, users or the file
system. Metadata can describe how, when and by whom ESI was collected, created,
accessed, modified and how it is formatted. Can be altered intentionally or inadvertently.
Certain metadata can be extracted when native files are processed for litigation. Some
metadata, such as file dates and sizes, can easily be seen by users; other metadata can be
hidden or embedded and unavailable to computer users who are not technically adept.
Metadata is generally not reproduced in full form when a document is printed to paper or
electronic image.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD. (WGI)

RFP+ GROUP, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION
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In recent years, the amount of electronically stored information
("ESI") has vastly surpassed the amount of information stored as
tangible paper documents. While estimates of an exact figure vary, with
regard to corporate entities, generally, ninety-three percent of
information is generated in electronic form. 82
Consequently, ESI makes up a great deal of the information stored
as potentially relevant evidence in litigation.83 Its increasingly significant
role in discovery has made ESI the subject of many discovery disputes
relating to the discovery process.84 The combination of the enormous
amount of ESI and today's "litigious culture," which "creates the
likelihood that many corporate activities will eventually be the subject of
litigation,,a creates a great deal of confusion in discovery. Perhaps what
is most perplexing and difficult to reconcile in terms of ESI is the fact
that the capabilities of metadata result in a situation in which files that
are "deleted" from a computer are not actually destroyed, but in fact,
remain stored within an electronic information system.
This, in turn, leads to an interesting dilemma for the courts.
Because of the metadata capabilities of ESI, information that is believed
to have been destroyed remains tucked away, hidden on a hard drive in
an electronic storage system, and thus actually remains available.87
However, when a party fails to produce electronic documents that it has

MANAGEMENT 33 (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/misc
Files/TSCGlossary_12 07.pdf.
82. Kenneth J. Withers, National Workshop for United States Magistrate Judges: Electronic
Discovery (June 12, 2002), available at http://www/kenwithers.com/articles/minneapolis/
index.html; see also SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 81, at 2 (stating that there is "substantially
more electronically stored information than paper documents, and electronically stored information
is created and replicated at much greater rates than paper documents").
83. It should be noted, as a threshold matter, that ESI is discoverable under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the same rules that apply to paper documents apply to ESI. FED. R. Civ. P.
34(a)(1)(A) (stating that electronically stored information is subject to discovery). E.g., Antioch Co.
v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (stating that Rule 34 applies to
electronic data); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(stating that computer records, including those that are "deleted," are discoverable under Rule 34).
84. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 17 ("[M]any corporations are faced with the
Hobson's choice of either preserving vast quantities of electronic data without any indication that
the data will ever be relevant to litigation or deleting such data while running the risk of potential
spoliation sanctions.").
85. Id.
86. Andrew Moerke Mason, Note, Throwing Out the (Electronic) Trash: True Deletion
Would Soothe E-Discovery Woes, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 777, 779 (2006).
87. See id; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Finding
a suitable sanction for the destruction of evidence in civil cases has never been easy. Electronic
evidence only complicates matters. As documents are increasingly maintained electronically, it has
become easier to delete or tamper with evidence (both intentionally and inadvertently) and more
difficult for litigants to craft policies that ensure all relevant documents are preserved.").
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a duty to preserve, courts are faced with the challenge of attempting to
"strike a balance between the general duty to preserve discovery and the
impracticality of preserving" various types of electronic data.8
B. Striking a Balance, or Striking Out?: Document Retention Policies
and the Scope of the Duty to Preserve
The scope of the duty to preserve relevant documents as potential
evidence in litigation takes an interesting twist in light of e-discovery. 89
Substantial challenges have arisen based on the relationship between the
sheer volume of electronic information system storage capabilities,90
corporate document retention policies, 91 and the duty to preserve
relevant evidence when litigation is imminent.92 Consequently, "[c]ourts
have found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the unique nuances of
electronic discovery with the existing federal rules." 93
Thus, trial courts are left with the novel and complicated task of
determining how to apply the duty to preserve evidence in light of these
circumstances brought on by technology.94 As an additional difficulty,
courts must often make this decision without a concrete understanding
of electronic information storage.95
Contemporary plaintiffs are often aware of the massive information
storage abilities of an electronic information storage system, as well as
the capabilities of these systems to retrieve "deleted" data. 6 As a result,
their adversaries are often burdened with onerous discovery requests.97

88. Nelson & Rosenberg, supranote 19, at 20.
89. See supra Part IIB; see also Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 25.
90. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supranote 81, at 2-5 (stating that actions to duplicate or back up
a file (in essence, forwarding an e-mail, moving a word processing file) only take seconds and
create enormous amounts of duplicative, yet still discoverable, information that can result in
unmanageable discovery costs and increased chances for spoliation claims).
91. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supranote 19, at 16.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Rena Durrant, Note, Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1803, 1806 (2005).
94. Hodgman, supranote 63, at 275 ("Modem electronic discovery is fundamentally different
in many respects from more traditional, paper-based discovery. Electronic discovery confounds the
traditional frameworks established by both the Civil Rules and discovery sanctions.").
95. Crist, supra note 29, at 23 (explaining the lack of familiarity among courts and litigants of
the creation, modification, and storage of electronic data, and its consequences on the duty to
preserve and the discovery process as a whole).
96. Deleted data generally remains on a computer hard drive until the space is actually
overwritten, thus rendering it still potentially discoverable. Brian Organ, Discoverability of
Electronic Evidence, 2005 SYRACUSE SC. & TECH. L. REP. 5, 8.
97. Sasha K. Danna, Note, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the
Applicability of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1683, 1688-89
(2005) (explaining how "discovery requests seeking electronic data are more likely to be unduly
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The requests, although falling within the bounds set by the FRCP,98 are
burdensome because of the exceedingly high costs that may result from
compliance with the discovery request, as well as the difficulty in
achieving the restoration of "deleted" documents. 99
In response to the potential for burdensome document requests,
many corporations adopt document retention policies whereby
"[e]lectronic data is routinely deleted from a business' 'active' computer
system."100 Herein, however, creates the problem faced by courts, as
these automated deletion features gave rise to spoliation claims in
instances where some of the information encompassed in an automatic
purging of documents was "relevant," and thus within the duty to
preserve potential evidence in the face of litigation. 0 1 The courts, then,
must attempt to strike a balance between the need to sanction parties for
spoliation of evidence, while at the same time, keeping in mind that,
"[i]n a world where the very act of deletion is integral to normal
operations, it is unfair to treat the inadvertent or negligent loss of [ESI]
as indicative of intent to destroy evidence and to thereby infer

spoliation."l 02
Prior to the 2007 amendments to the FRCP, the application of the
duty to preserve by courts in e-discovery conflicts was unclear and
varied across the courts.103 Consequently, it became increasingly
burdensome than those seeking paper documents").
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (noting the scope of discovery extends to all documents that are
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" at trial); FED. R. CIv. P.
34(a)(1)(A) (stating electronically stored information is discoverable).
99. See, e.g., Lisa M. Arent et al., Discovery Preserving,Requesting & Producing Electronic
Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 148 (2002) (stating that the cost
of reviewing backup tapes for responsive information can run up to tens of thousands of dollars).
100. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 16.
101. See Marilee S. Chan, Note, Paper Piles to Computer Files: A Federal Approach to
Electronic Records Retention and Management, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805, 809 (2004) (citing
J. Edwin Dietel, Corporate Compliance Series: Designing an Effective Records Retention
Compliance Program,CORPc-RECR § 1:26 (2003)).
102. Thomas Y. Allman, Inadvertant Spoliation of ESI After the 2006 Amendments: The
Impact ofRule 37(e), 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 25, 28 (2009).
103. Compare Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at *12-18
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003) (highlighting a stringent interpretation of a party's duty to preserve relevant
evidence, where the court held that the defendant had breached its duty to preserve when it did not
act to prevent the automated destruction of e-mail messages and did not perform a search of
electronic data for relevant material before deleting when this evidence was "reasonably likely" to
be requested in discovery, even before the order was received by the party), with Concord Boat
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24068, at *15-17 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 29, 1997) (exemplifying a less stringent, technology friendly interpretation of the duty to
preserve). In Concord Boat Corp., the court held that while a duty to preserve all relevant e-mail
unquestionably exists subsequent to the initiation of a lawsuit, the corporate defendant was under no
such duty to preserve all relevant e-mail messages prior to the initiation of the suit. 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24068, at *15-17. To find as much would impose an onerous burden and "be tantamount to
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difficult for parties to predict at what point the duty to preserve was
triggered and the circumstances under which compliance with a
corporate document retention policy may give rise to a claim for
spoliation.1 04
C. Light at the End of the Tunnel?: Zubulake's Attempt at Clarityfor
the FederalCourts
A 2003 case out of the Southern District of New York, Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg,'s has been recognized as being particularly helpful in
providing guidance "as to the extent of a corporate defendant's
electronic discovery preservation obligations."' 06 In Zubulake, the court
held that it would be unreasonable to require a party to preserve "every
shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup
tape," as this would "cripple" the business practices of corporate

defendants.107
Rather, the Zubulake court emphasized that the duty to preserve
turns on the combination of a party's anticipation of litigation and the
protection of its adversary from destruction of "unique, relevant
evidence that might be useful," as determined based on a reasonable
calculation of the relevance of documents in a pending action.'0o
The Zubulake decision also offered guidance as to the specific
kinds of documents that must be retained once the duty to preserve is
triggered.109 According to the court, in addition to documents
encompassed under FRCP 34(a),"o "[t]he duty also includes documents
prepared for those individuals [involved in the litigation], to the extent
those documents can be readily identified (e.g., from the 'to' field in emails)."'' In addition, the Zubulake court held that "information that is
relevant to the claims or defenses of any party, or which is 'relevant to
holding that [a] corporation must preserve all e-mail." Id.
104. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 25 (noting that the imposition of spoliation
sanctions is "fact-specific," and that few courts had "attempted to promulgate broadly applicable
standards to guide corporations regarding the specific nature of their responsibilities to preserve
[ESI], due to the impracticalities of preserving all electronic data with even a slim possibility of
relevance").
105. 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing an employment discrimination dispute
in which several employees deleted e-mail messages despite instructions to keep them, and
corporate counsel failed to take steps to preserve the tapes until they were expressly requested in
one of plaintiff's discovery requests).
106. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 25.
107. 220 F.R.D. at 217.
108. Id
109. Id. at 218.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
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the subject matter involved in the action,"' falls within the ambit of the
duty to preserve.1 12 Zubulake held that the duty to preserve "extends to
those employees likely to have relevant information-the 'key players'

in the case."

13

Once the duty to preserve attaches, Zubulake requires that "[a]
party ... must retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any
relevant documents created thereafter," and, as a general rule, the
preservation obligation does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes,
except in cases where "a company can identify where particular
employee documents are stored on backup tapes."' 1 4 Then, the tapes
storing the documents of the "key players" to the existing litigation
should be preserved if the information is not otherwise available." 5
Despite the recognition of Zubulake's importance to e-discovery, in
actuality, the decision does little in the way of offering bright-line
standards, or even significant guidance, on the duty to preserve."
D. Something to be Desired: E-Discovery in the Post-ZubulakeEra
Following the Zubulake decision, there was hope throughout the
federal court system that parties and judges alike would have a clearer
understanding of their responsibilities relating to document preservation
in relation to ESI." 7 After Zubulake, courts began to recognize and
impose a heightened duty on parties to preserve electronic evidence. 18
Under this duty, once a dispute reaches the point where litigation is
reasonably anticipated, a party must put in place a "litigation hold"l 9
and suspend any routine document purging system to ensure document

preservation.120
Despite the attempt by the Zubulake court to clarify a party's duty
to preserve, inconsistent decisions in its wake dashed the hope for

112. Id (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cf Crist, supra note 29, at 18 (noting that there was disagreement among courts as to
when the duty to preserve attaches in the wake of Zubulake).
117. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Spoliation ofElectronic Evidence: This Way Be
Dragons,68 TEx. B.J. 478, 478 (2005).
118. Id at479.
119. A "litigation hold" is a duty placed upon organizations to suspend any document deletion
polices in order to preserve potentially relevant evidence. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
120. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 295, 298 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding
that a litigation hold should have been in place before the commencement of litigation because the
litigation was reasonably anticipated).
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uniformity in the federal courts. 2 ' What proved most problematic in the
post-Zubulake era was the rule that an obligation to preserve is triggered
at the moment when a party begins to "consider the possibility of
litigation," which imposes too onerous a burden on corporate defendants
in light of the "constant threat of litigation facing corporate America."1 22
Thus, while the Zubulake decision seems to alleviate e-discovery
problems, the realities of electronic information storage, coupled with a
nearly perpetual threat of litigation faced by corporate defendants, make
its application infeasible in practice.12 3 Strict application of the Zubulake
principles would require that nearly every shred of electronic data be
saved, as corporate defendants face the reality that potential plaintiffs'
attorneys are on a seemingly constant mission to litigate.124 Viewed
through the lens of Zubulake, this essentially requires that potential
defendants place a perpetual litigation hold on document production and
retention.125 Although a litigation hold appears reasonable in the
abstract, or when considered on a case-by-case basis, such a preservation
obligation is overly burdensome in practice.12 6
In its wake, the standard set by Zubulake has resulted in a heavily
plaintiff-friendly approach to document retention, especially considering
that corporate defendants have a "seemingly limitless obligation" to
retain documents when there is even the slightest possibility of litigation
in the future.12 7 Zubulake, then, rather than providing the clarity and
uniformity that many had initially hoped it would,12 8 largely seemed to
result in a "'litigation hold' for some corporate defendants in
perpetuity."l29
Consequently, courts in the wake of Zubulake did not apply the
duty to preserve and implement litigation holds in a uniform manner. In
121. Compare E*TRADE Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582, 588 (D. Minn.
2005) (holding that the duty to preserve attached prior to the commencement of litigation because of
the evidence's relevance to the subject matter of the future litigation), with Treppel v. Biovail Corp.,
233 F.R.D. 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a party's preservation obligations attached when
the party became aware of the filing of the complaint, because the mere existence of dispute
between the parties was not sufficient to impose reasonable anticipation of litigation on the parties).
122. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 29.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 31.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Andrew Hebl, Spoliation of ElectronicallyStored Information, Good Faith, and
Rule 37(e), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 79, 92 (2008) ("[P]arties cannot be expected to preserve every
relevant electronic document after a preservation obligation arises. Because of the nature of
electronically stored information, [it] ... places too great a burden on the parties.").
127. See Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 32.
128. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 117, at 479 ("Will Zubulake's clear reasoning and
explicit standards be heeded? Commentators . . .believe it will.").
129. Nelson & Rosenberg, supranote 19, at 31.
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some instances, courts followed the standard set by Zubulake.130 One
such example is Broccoli v. Echostar Communications Corp.,' 3 1 where
the court held that the defendant's duty to preserve was triggered when
the plaintiff employee first began to complain about sexual harassment
by his supervisor, which was eleven months before the plaintiff was
fired and fourteen months before a complaint was filed.132
Other courts, such as the court in Treppel v. Biovail Corp.,133
recognized the severity of the Zubulake standard on corporate
defendants and were unwilling to impose quite as heavy a burden.13 4
These courts took a more narrow approach to the application of the duty
to preserve, and the court in Treppel held that a mere dispute between
the parties was insufficient to trigger the duty to preserve, as it did not
create grounds for the reasonable anticipation of litigation.,35 Instead, the
court held that the duty to preserve did not attach until the defendant
became aware of the filing of a formal complaint.13 6
When attempting to impose sanctions for the seemingly inadvertent
destruction of potential evidence resulting from adherence to corporate
document retention policies, it is necessary for courts to strike a balance
between the policies behind the Zubulake standard, favoring the wide
availability of potential evidence, with the realities of the burdens that
such a standard imposes on defendants, especially in the corporate
context.137 In E*TRADE Securities LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG,' 3" the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that
sanctions may be imposed for the destruction of potential evidence that
occurred before litigation commenced when that destruction is the result
of bad faith.'" 9 However, the court noted that, absent the destruction of
relevant paper documents by a corporate defendant, mere failure to
institute a "litigation hold" in and of itself does not suffice to constitute

130. See, e.g., Danis v. USN Conc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 834-35 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (imposing sanctions for spoliation on a party for failure to implement a suitable document
preservation program; even though the party took affirmative steps to preserve relevant evidence,
those steps were inadequate, thus warranting sanctions and serving as a strict application of the duty
to preserve relevant evidence).
131. 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005).
132. Id. at S11.
133. 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
134. See id. at 371.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Crist, supranote 29, at 35-36; Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 31.
138. 230 F.R.D. 582 (D. Minn. 2005).
139. Id. at 588.
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bad faith. 140 This decision is an example of a court attempting to strike a
balance between Zubulake's countervailing policies.'14
In E*TRADE Securities, the court held that sanctions for spoliation
are appropriate when a party acted in bad faith, a finding of which can
be based on a party's behavior with regard to its corporate document
retention policy.14 2 To determine bad faith, the court considered the
reasonableness of that policy "considering the facts and circumstances
surrounding those documents, . . . whether lawsuits or complaints have
been filed frequently concerning the type of records at issue,
and .. . whether the document retention policy was instituted in bad
faith."' 43
Because no easily applicable standards were promulgated in the
federal court system, parties remained uncertain as to precisely when the
duty to preserve potential evidence arises.'" In United States v. Arthur
Andersen, LLP,14 5 these problems were brought to light.146 In this
infamous case,14 7 employees of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen
were advised to shred documents on the eve of the SEC's investigation
of the firm's client, Enron.14 8 The destruction, despite the pending
investigation of Enron, was conducted based on the corporate document
retention policy in place at the firm.14 9 The conflict between corporate
document retention policies and the duty to preserve potential evidence
in a foreseeable litigation is the source of the greatest confusion in terms
of the application of spoliation sanctions.'5 s
The necessity of corporate document destruction policies is widely
recognized.' 5 ' In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court noted that when
140. See id. at 591.
141. Id. (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212,217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
142. Id. at 588.
143. Id. at 588-89 (quoting Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 747-48 (8th Cir.
2004)).
144. Crist, supranote 29, at 18.
145. 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'don othergrounds, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
146. See Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Arthur Andersen and the Temple of Doom, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 97,
107-11 (2008).
147. Id. at 97.
148. ArthurAndersen, LLP, 374 F.3d at 285-86.
149. Arthur Andersen in-house counsel Michael Odom sent an e-mail message, based on
outside counsel Nancy Temple's advice, on October 10, 2001 that "urged Andersen personnel to
comply with the document retention policy," and noted that if a potentially relevant document was
"'destroyed in the course of normal policy and litigation is filed the next day, that's great ... we've
followed our own policy and whatever there was that might have been of interest to somebody is
gone and irretrievable."' Id at 285-86 (omission in original).
150. See Kinsler,supra note 146, at 112-15 (discussing case law with varied applications of the
duty to preserve and imposition of sanctions).
151. Id. at 111 ("Storage of documents and other records is expensive and burdensome. Thus, a
company ordinarily may destroy documents pursuant to a document retention policy that is
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such a policy is reasonable and evenly applied, it is "not wrongful for a
manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document
retention policy under ordinary circumstances." 5 2 However, when
litigation becomes foreseeable, it becomes necessary to reconcile
compliance with company policy with the duty to preserve potential
evidence, and courts will impose sanctions for parties that fail to do
so.153

Despite this recognition, different standards continued to be applied
across the federal court system, and uniformity had yet to be achieved.15 4
Courts across the country recognized that when a party knew or should
have known that documents might become material to litigation at some
point in the future, and nonetheless destroys them, that party "cannot
blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly
innocuous document retention policy."s55 It was against this background,
in an attempt to clarify the duty to preserve, that Rule 37(e) was adopted
into the FRCP.'56
IV.

RULE 37(e): A FEDERAL ATTEMPT AT A SOLUTION TO THE EDISCOVERY PROBLEM

A. Aiming for Clarity: The Backdrop ofRule 37(e),
the "Safe Harbor"Provision
Rule 37(e) was proposed by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
as an addition to the FRCP as part of the 2007 e-discovery
amendments.' 57 It was added specifically to deal with the nuanced
problems brought about by e-discovery and the preservation obligation
in litigation. 58 It was also intended to rectify the lack of clarity as to the
reasonable and evenly applied.").
152. 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
153. Courts have held that parties may be sanctioned for failure to preserve potential evidence
as a consequence of compliance with document retention policies based on failure to provide
notification to relevant personnel when litigation becomes foreseeable, failure to suspend the
destruction plan when litigation becomes foreseeable, and inconsistent application of said document
policy and a lack of bad faith, shown by unusual or sporadic destruction of documents associated
with a particular foreseeable litigation. See Kinsler,supra note 146, at 112-15.
154. See supra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.
155. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Gumbs v. Int'l
Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)).
156. See infra Part IV.A.
157. Lloyd S. van Oostenrijk, Comment, Paper or Plastic?: Electronic Discovery and
Spoliationin the DigitalAge, 42 HoUs. L. REv. 1163, 1168-69 (2005).
158. See Memorandum from Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure 55 (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2004.pdf.
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circumstances under which it is appropriate for a court to impose
sanctions for the spoliation of potential evidence.15 9
Rule 37(e) was proposed in order to achieve "the needed balance
between information preservation and continuation of business
operations. ,01 In addition, Rule 37(e) attempted to address the prevalent
problems associated with the massive amounts of data that corporate
defendants were theoretically required to store in the interest of potential
future litigation.16 1
Prior to its implementation into the FRCP, there was a general
feeling of skepticism towards Rule 37(e).162 While it was clear that
courts had not reached a consensus as to when spoliation sanctions were
appropriate, critics did not believe that Rule 37(e) offered much in the
way of providing a stricter or more easily applicable set of guidelines for
courts to follow. 163 Rather, many believed that the proposed Rule would
have an insignificant impact on e-discovery. 16
At the time of its drafting, Rule 37(e) appeared to be a wellintentioned, yet premature, attempt at a solution to e-discovery
problems.16 1 While it was not debated that ESI continued to have an
increasingly prominent role in discovery, this role varied from case to
case, largely as a consequence of the relatively new nature of ediscovery.16 6 Consequently, rather than the adoption of a federal rule to
govern this aspect of e-discovery, it was thought that a "wait and see"
approach ought to be taken until ESI had a more clear-cut role in

159. Chan, supra note 101, at 820 ("[N]o federal law solely addresses the management of
electronic records retention and destruction. Companies are accountable for their own policies, yet
are still responsible for incorporating a myriad of inconsistent state and federal laws.").
160. Mason, supra note 86, at 786.
161. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 36 ("The. . . amendments represent a wideranging effort to conform the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the digital age."); Richard Marcus,
Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17
(2004) (acknowledging that "[e]-discovery is new, and the breadth of use of computers is also
relatively new,. . . [clients and lawyers] await the decision of a judge in the future, and the judge
will be acting in an area with few landmarks").
162. Anita Ramasastry, The Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules: While Trying to Add
2004,
15,
Sept.
FINDLAW,
Uncertainty,
Leave
Still
Rules
the
Clarity,
http://articles.technology.findlaw.com/2004/Sep/l5/10103.html ("[T]he rules' proposals as to when
sanctions can be imposed for deletion of electronic information ... leave something to be desired.").
163. See, e.g., id.
164. See, e.g., Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 38 ("While seemingly an important step
in the ongoing effort to reflect the impact of electronic discovery upon a litigant's preservation
obligations, [the proposed rule] will have little, if any, practical impact upon these obligations.").
165. See Ramasastry, supranote 162.
166. See, e.g., Hester v. Bayer Corp., 206 F.R.D. 683, 685-86 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (stating that
preservation orders and duties to preserve are unique to each case because "like snowflakes, no two
litigations are alike"); see also Hodgman, supra note 63, at 286.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 11

814

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 38:793

discovery.16 7 However, despite its critics, Rule 37(e) was included as
part of the 2007 e-discovery amendments to the FRCP.168
B. PuttingPolicy into Practice: UnderstandingRule 37(e)
At its adoption, the legal world looked to Rule 37(e) to provide
some much needed relief to e-discovery problems.169 Much of this relief
was expected to come from the "safe harbor" provision in the Rule.17 0
This provision precludes a party that destroyed data as a consequence of
the routine operation of an electronic information system, rather than as
a result of culpable, bad-faith conduct, from being sanctioned under Rule
37(b)(2) for failure to produce the documents relevant to its adversary's
request.' 7'
Much to the chagrin of its proponents, the most glaring problem
with Rule 37(e), since it has been adopted, is that it has not led to any
much needed clarity as had been its purpose.17 2 One explanation for this
ineffectiveness lies within the language of the Rule. 7 3 The Advisory
Committee notes to Rule 37(e) attempt to define the type of lost
information protected by the Rule's safe harbor provision; it explicitly
states that Rule 37(e) is applicable if and only if the operation of the
information system was both routine and in good faith.174
This explanation, however, has essentially proved to be circular.
Under Rule 37(e), good faith requires that a party adhere to its
preservation obligation, whereby it must intervene with any document
destruction policy and "modify or suspend certain features of that
167. Hodgman, supranote 63, at 286.
168. Davidovitch, supranote 3, at 1131.
169. See David Wilner, e-Discovery Worries?: Proposed Federal Rules on Electronic
Discovery May Have a Broad Impact, CORP. COUNSELOR, Nov. 2004, available at
https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/NewsEvents/PDFs/20041 1 CorpCounseloreDiscWo
rries.pdf (stating that Rule 37(e) will deliver relief to litigants who operate sophisticated electronic
information systems in good faith, but are nonetheless held accountable if those information
systems' routine deletion functions cause the loss of information that may be relevant to litigation).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) ("[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as
a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.").
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note ("Many steps essential to computer
operation may alter or destroy information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that
information might relate to litigation. As a result, the ordinary operation of computer systems
creates a risk that a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable conduct on
its part. Under Rule 37(e), absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss
of electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system."(emphasis added)).
172. See supraPartIlll.D.
173. See Ramasastry,supranote 162.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) & advisory committee's note.
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routine operation to prevent the loss" of potentially relevant
when litigation is reasonably foreseeable. 7 5
documentation
Additionally, the Advisory Committee notes state that a court should
consider a variety of factors in determining whether the destruction of
documents was in good faith.' 76 This includes "the steps the party took
to comply with a court order in the case or party agreement requiring
preservation of specific electronically stored information." 7 7
The language of Rule 37(e) is problematic because, once put into
practice, it offers little constructive guidance as to precisely when a party
will be relieved from sanctions due to its failure to produce evidence. 7 8
Additionally, it provides the opportunity for corporate defendants to
utilize the Rule's safe harbor provision as a cushion and allow those who
are "inclined to obscure or destroy evidence of any sort. . . to hide
behind the shield of good faith and undue burden to protect themselves

from sanctions."

79

Rather than giving rise to disputes over concrete issues relating to
the actual documents in question, the wording of Rule 37(e) has led to
discovery disputes over what constitutes "'routine, good-faith
operation"' in terms of properly adhering to the duty to preserve. so As a
result, courts must spend a great deal of time making "decisions as to
what is reasonable and what is done in good faith," which "undermine[s]
the consistency and predictability that discovery rules generally seek to
create."'' In this way, Rule 37(e) runs counter to the purposes of the

FRCP.182
A great deal of this difficulty stems from the fact that the FRCP do
not apply directly to pre-litigation conduct.18 3 This creates complications

175. Id.; see also Hebl, supra note 126, at 101 ("If. . . a party takes affirmative, though
inadequate, steps to preserve relevant data, that party should have the protection of the safe harbor,
since taking those affirmative steps is evidence that the party did not spoliate evidence .. .in bad
faith.").
176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note.
177. Id.
178. See Rachel Hytken, Comment, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006
Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 875, 898 (2008).
179. Ryan J. Reaves, The Dangers of E-Discovery and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,3 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 32, 38-39 (2007).
180. Id at37.
18 1. Id.
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the FRCP "should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
183. See ABC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 180, 182 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) ("Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to impose sanctions
for discovery abuses. . . . In this case, Rule 37 does not directly apply because the alleged
destruction of documents took place before the action was filed and before discovery began.").
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because the duty to preserve may arise before litigation commences.184
In contrast, when the duty to preserve is breached after litigation has
commenced, the FRCP undoubtedly provide the authority for the court
to impose sanctions.'" However, when a violation of the duty occurs
before litigation commences, it is less clear as to whether or not Rule
37(e) may be invoked.' 86 Therefore, Rule 37(e) is problematic in that it
"addresses only sanctions under the federal rules, which generally do not
apply prior to commencement of litigation."' 8 7 This, then, requires that a
party predict what will be discoverable before becoming involved in a
lawsuit or receiving a discovery request, rather than being provided with
guidance from the text of the FRCP.188
Despite the hopes of the Advisory Committee, Rule 37(e) has not
89
offered the clear guidance that it was initially proposed to provide.
The application of Rule 37(e) has resulted in confusion over its meaning,
rather than focusing on concrete disputes relating to the actual
90
documents in question and the imposition of spoliation sanctions.1
Consequently, the question must arise as to whether or not parties are
any better off since the inception of Rule 37(e) than they were prior to it.
The absence of guidance for parties that are following document
retention policies and for when a party may expect to incur spoliation
sanctions leads one to believe parties are, in fact, worse off since Rule
37(e) was enacted.' 9'
An unquestionable shortcoming of Rule 37(e) is the limited scope
of protection that it provides to parties.' 92 Based on the text of Rule
37(e), in order for a party's actions to fall under the umbrella of
protection provided by the safe harbor provision,
a party to litigation must (1) have a routine operating protocol for the
storage and destruction of its electronically stored information, (2) not
delete files potentially responsive to litigation in any manner
184. See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1443, 1446 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (stating that the parties were on notice of the litigation because of pre-litigation
correspondence between the parties, and thus the duty to preserve was triggered).
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (listing possible sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery
order).
186. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (stating that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint).
187. Allman, supra note 1, at 15.
188. See id. at 15-16.
189. Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 40 (noting that the e-discovery amendments "fail
to provide litigants with the necessary guidance concerning the precise extent of electronic
discovery preservation obligations").
190. See Davidovitch, supra note 3, at 1133-41 (discussing the intricate analysis which is
required in order to determine whether Rule 37(e) is applicable in a particular case).
191. See supratext accompanying notes 172-87.
192. See Davidovitch,supra note 3, at 1141.
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inconsistent with its protocol, and (3) suspend the destruction protocol
with respect to any backup tapes or other storage devices that contain
files its knows may be relevant to a dispute likely to result in a
litigation.193
Thus, Rule 37(e), while it may appear on its surface to provide
broad protection to parties who inadvertently destroy ESI, in reality, the
class of those that are protected is far more restricted. 19 4 Instead, it
applies only to those who comply with the standards set in the text of the

Rule. 195
V.

WHERE TO

GO FROM HERE?: THE FUTURE OF RULE 37(e)

A. Taking out the Garbage: The Needfor a New Rule 37(e) and an
Emphasis on the Duty to Preserve
It is clear that Rule 37(e) has not proved to offer any novel and
significant protections to parties in the digital era.196 Because parties are
not given bright-line parameters, or even significant guidance as to when
the duty to preserve is triggered, Rule 37(e) has not functioned in a way
that coincides with the FRCP goal of "just, speedy, and inexpensive"
determination of litigations. 197 The combination of this uncertain scope
of preservation obligations and the risk of sanctions if information is not
preserved oftentimes results in an over-broad pre-litigation preservation
effort, which is extremely costly and time consuming for corporate
defendants.19 8 In order for Rule 37(e) to function in a way consistent
with the purpose of the FRCP, courts must reevaluate the Rule.
Rule 37(e) states that its protection is applied "absent exceptional
circumstances."' 99 In terms of defining what constitutes "exceptional
circumstances," the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure notes only that such an exceptional circumstance could
"permit[s] sanctions ... even when information is lost because of a

193.
and the
(2007).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Daniel R. Murray et al., Discovery in a Digital Age. Electronically Stored Information
New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 U.C.C. L.J. 509, 525-26
Id. at 526.
Id. at 525-26.
See supra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
Hebl, supranote 126, at 92.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (emphasis added).
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party's good-faith routine operation of a computer system."2 00 Thus, a
party loses the protection of Rule 37(e) if "exceptional circumstances"
warrant the imposition of sanctions despite satisfaction of requirements
under Rule 37(e).20 1
This creates a hurdle for parties that seek the protection of Rule
37(e), as it is unclear what constitutes "exceptional circumstances."2 02
Due to the absence of guidelines for applying Rule 37(e), courts are left
with "tremendous discretion" in determining proper application of the
Rule.203 As presently interpreted, the "exceptional circumstances" clause
results in a bias towards parties requesting documents because of the
emphasis on the provision of remedies for innocent parties, and thus the
application of Rule 37(e) "distills" the law regarding spoliation
sanctions.2 04
Traditionally, spoliation sanctions have been imposed in order to
serve prophylactic, punitive, and remedial functions. 205 However, the
phrase "exceptional circumstances" allows courts to essentially discount
the mental state of the party that destroyed relevant documents.2 06 By
giving courts the authority to find "exceptional circumstances," Rule
37(e) may allow courts to place undue emphasis on remedying the
evidentiary playing field for the party requesting the destroyed
documents.207
Rule 37(e) leaves unaddressed an especially vexing problem for the
courts: the destruction of documents not in bad faith, but as Rule 37(e)
states, as a consequence of the "good faith" operation of an electronic
information system.20 8 The inadvertent destruction of evidence, despite
the lack of bad faith, may nevertheless leave the requesting party at a
disadvantage.20 9

200.

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF

PRACTICE & PROC. 83 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/STO9-2005.pdf#
page= 168.
201. See id.
202. Hytken, supra note 178, at 895 ("[A] judge, upon a finding of 'extraordinary
circumstances,' can sanction a party that meets the general requirements of Rule 37. Neither the
Committee nor the courts have attempted to define this term; there is no sense of when, if, or how
this term will take on meaning.").
203. Id. at 899.
204. Davidovitch, supranote 3, at 1141.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
206. Davidovitch, supranote 3, at 1141.
207. See id. at 1141-42.
208. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
209. See, e.g., Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79232, at *27-29 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008) (noting that despite a party's duty to preserve, and
gross negligence, the failure to preserve evidence did not rise to the level of bad faith conduct).
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It is important to keep in mind what constitutes good faith; as a
general principle, it is commonly understood to be the absence of bad
faith.210 In the context of spoliation, bad faith may be discerned from the
direct destruction of documents by a party in order to hide information
adverse to its case. 2 11 Bad faith in this context may also be characterized
by "'willful blindness,"' whereby a party is aware of discoverable
evidence, but "nonetheless allows for its destruction."212
It is long established that courts have wide discretion in the
imposition of sanctions for spoliation.2 13 In using this discretion, courts
take into account both the intent and state of mind of the party that fails
to produce evidence when determining whether or not sanctions are
appropriate. 214 Under Rule 37(e), then, "courts will likely assess the
intent of a producing party .. . as well as the prejudice to the requesting
party resulting from the inability to obtain such data." 2 15 This is not a
novel creation of Rule 37(e). 1 Rather, this is a reiteration of the
commonly accepted method for imposing spoliation sanctions.217
B. Shifting the Focus to a New Solution to E-Discovery Problems
In United Medical Supply Co. v. United States,2 18 the court asserted
that "spoliation sanctions spring from two main sources of authority": 2 19
first, the "inherent power [of the court] to control the judicial process
and litigation, a power that is necessary to redress conduct 'which abuses
the judicial process'"; and second, the authority given under Rule
37(b)(2) to impose sanctions in appropriate circumstances.22 0 Using
these powers, the court must craft sanctions that are "just and
proportionate in light of the circumstances underlying the failure to

210. Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1924) ("Good faith
is fidelity and honesty, and bad faith is the opposite; and the definition of one defines its antonym
by the addition of a negative.").
211. Durrant, supra note 93, at 1819; see also Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd.,
51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 279, 286 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a party acted in bad faith by
deleting relevant webpages from a webserver and altering the server's log files).
212. Id at 1819 (citing Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 878
(N.D. Ill. 2000)).
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. See supra Part II.D.
215. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The
Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,30 CARDOZO L. REV.
347, 368 (2008).
216. See supra Part II.D.
217. See supra Part II.D.
218. 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007).
219. Id. at 263.
220. Id. at 263-64 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)).
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preserve relevant evidence, as well as the punitive, prophylactic,
remedial and institutional purposes to be served by such sanctions."2 2 1
In light of the multitude of factors to be taken into account, Rule
37(e) is ineffective.222 The considerations that a court must make prior to
imposing sanctions on a party already encompass the concern that fueled
the implementation of the Rule, rendering it unnecessary.22 3 Therefore,
Rule 37(e) should be removed from the FRCP.
The language of Rule 37(e) has been interpreted to require a
showing of intentional or reckless conduct in order for a court to impose
spoliation sanctions.224 This ensures that a party that engaged in
egregious conduct cannot invoke the protection of Rule 37(e)'s safe
harbor. 2 25 For example, in Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.,226 the
defendant party was unable to claim the protection of Rule 37(e) because
the court found that it had intentionally deleted documents from that
company's webpage that were requested in a discovery order. 2 2 7 Despite
that the party was technically following its corporate document retention
policy, that party was not afforded the protection of Rule 37(e) because
of its willful disregard of the duty to preserve these potentially relevant
documents.2 28
The "good faith" requirement in Rule 37(e) prevents precisely this
type of conduct, and, in doing so, prevents parties from using the safe
harbor as a shield for outright failure to institute a litigation hold when
the duty of preservation has attached. 22 9 This protection is consistent
with the spoliation doctrine as it stood prior to e-discovery, because
through the Rule, courts are able to impose sanctions that are consistent
with the purposes that underlie the doctrine.230
221. Id. at 270; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
222. See Davidovitch, supranote 3, at 1141-42.
223. See id. at 1165.
224. See FED R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note ("The good faith requirement of Rule
37[(e)] means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information system
to thwart discovery obligations. . . ."); see also Hebl, supra note 126, at 98 (stating that case law
and committee notes "are entirely consistent with the idea that good faith requires some sort of
reckless or intentional conduct for the protection of the safe harbor to be withdrawn").
225. See, e.g., In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 768-69 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (finding that
defendant was not entitled to safe harbor protection because he did not act in good faith when he
failed to disable the running of a file-wiping feature and then re-installed a data-erasing program
after the preservation duty had attached).
226. 608 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
227. Id. at 438-39.
228. See id.
229. In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that a
party's "utter failure to preserve documents" after receiving plaintiffs complaint warrants spoliation
sanctions because the duty to preserve had clearly attached).
230. See supra Part II.D.
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Since its adoption, Rule 37(e) has left parties in no better a position
than they were prior to the Rule's enactment. 23 1 The combination of both
the inherent power of the court and that of Rule 37(b)(2) provide
sufficient authority for courts to sanction parties for spoliation, even in
light of the problems created by ESI.232 Under Rule 37(e), parties have
not received any protection that they would not have had absent the
Rule.233 The safe harbor provision erects a bar against parties who
engage in purposeful, bad-faith conduct and then look to use Rule 37(e)
as a shield for its bad acts; these parties, however, are already precluded
from this protection by the language of the Rule.234
In the end, the result is no different than imposition of spoliation
sanctions prior to the implementation Rule 37(e).235 Through application
of the traditional spoliation doctrine, courts should take a willful mindset
into account, balance it against the resultant prejudice to the opposing
party, and craft a sanction based on these considerations, as is the case in
the invocation of sanctions under the traditional spoliation doctrine.236
Therefore, common law development of the spoliation doctrine
gives courts ample ability to impose spoliation sanctions in the prelitigation context, and Rule 37(b)(2) remains sufficient to sanction
parties that violate specific discovery orders. This being the case, Rule
37(e) should be removed from the FRCP. The wide discretion already
afforded to trial courts in crafting sanctions will allow for the necessary
case-by-case consideration of discovery disputes, and appellate level

231. See Davidovitch, supra note 3, at 1165.
232. See id.
233. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 439. The defendant in Arista Records
blatantly disregarded a discovery order by willingly allowing documents that had been requested to
be deleted. Id. at 416-17. Even though this was in accordance with "company policy," the party was
not given the protection of Rule 37(e) because of the bad faith nature of the conduct. Id. at 439.
However, absent Rule 37(e), it is likely that the outcome would have been the same based on the
court's analysis of the party's conduct, coupled with the remedial function served by sanctions. See
id. at 429-30.
234. See supratext accompanying notes 224-27.
235. Compare In re Krause, 367 BR. 740, 766-69 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (holding that
defendant was not entitled to the protection of Rule 37(e) because he installed software specifically
designed to delete information from his electronic storage system after he was on notice of pending
litigation), with Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 487, 496-97
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (sanctioning defendant for spoliation when he purchased and utilized a software
program called "Evidence Eliminator" after he received a letter from the plaintiff regarding pending
litigation). Just as the willful, bad faith conduct in Kucala was sanctioned, so too was the analogous
conduct in Krause, despite the fact that Rule 37(e) was in place at the time Krause was decided.
This is because the bad faith nature of a party's actions precludes that party from receiving the
protection of the safe harbor.
236. See supra Part II.D.
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review for abuse of this discretion will ensure protection against abuses
of the power to sanction.2 37
Even after the implementation of Rule 37(e), courts continue to use
common law as their main source of guidance in terms of how to best
determine whether or not the duty to preserve relevant or potentially
relevant information has attached in a particular case.238 In Goodman v.
PraxairServices, Inc.,239 the court discusses the attachment of the duty
to preserve solely in terms of case law, without specific mention of Rule
37(e), despite the fact that the discovery dispute centers around the
deletion of back-up tapes that were requested during discovery.24 0
Instead of the current Rule 37(e), the problems brought about by
ESI will be most effectively resolved by creating standards for when the
duty to preserve attaches to parties in the time period before a complaint
is filed. A clearer understanding of when this duty attaches is essential
for parties involved in e-discovery. 24 1 This clarification is necessary so
that parties will be able to predict, with a degree of certainty, when they
must put litigation holds in place and modify their corporate document
242
Recent case law suggests that such a
retention policy procedures.
clarification has yet to come to light, and parties are essentially left in
the dark as to when the duty to preserve attaches.243
In order to best achieve this clarification, the courts must focus on
the principles set forth in Zubulake.24 While the standard created in
Zubulake creates too onerous a burden on parties, the rationale behind
the decision provides an appropriate framework within which clearer
guidelines for the duty to preserve may be established, and courts should
use this framework to create these guidelines. In Zubulake, the court
noted that "almost everyone associated with [the plaintiff] recognized
237. See Hytken, supra note 178, at 900 (noting the benefits and risks of the wide discretion
afforded to judges in crafting sanctions due to the potential unfamiliarity of judges with the subject
matter).
238. See Davidovitch, supranote 3, at 1165.
239. 632 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D. Md. 2009).
240. Id.at5ll-16.
241. See Hebl, supra note 126, at 104 ("Several cases have turned almost exclusively on
whether the obligation to preserve had arisen, and thereby have continued to apply an essentially
pre-Rule 37(e) analysis, since often, no consideration of state of mind even takes place.").
242. See id at 104-06 (discussing case law with varied outcomes and applications of Rule
37(e) in terms of when the duty to preserve is triggered).
243. Compare Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D.
Colo. 2007) (stating that the duty to preserve "should require more than a mere possibility of
litigation"), with Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 509 & n.7 (stating that the duty to preserve attaches
when litigation is reasonably anticipated). These cases exemplify the notion that, while courts state
when the duty to preserve relevant documents attaches, there is little predictability as to what this
means in terms of application from case to case.
244. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the possibility that she might sue."245 The recognition by those involved
in the eventual litigation was the determinative factor as to when the
court stated that the duty to preserve relevant evidence had been
triggered.24 6
Courts must focus on this prong of analysis in the future. A focus
on the individuals involved in the dispute will make understanding of the
duty to preserve more manageable for parties. The duty to preserve must
be centered around the individuals that are involved in a particular
dispute, and the determination as to when the duty attaches must be
centered on when these individuals know, or reasonably should know,
that litigation is forthcoming.
An ability to predict will allow for e-discovery to comport with the
goals of the FRCP, because it will reduce the time courts must spend
making inquiries into when the duty to preserve attaches. Additionally,
with this understanding, corporate parties will be better able to engage in
more efficient self-modification of document retention policies in a
conscious effort to reduce the possibilities of invocations of spoliation
sanctions. This in turn will better serve the goals of the judicial system
as a whole, as it will promote the wide availability of evidence.24 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

The exponential increase in the use of technology in these modern
times has certainly left discovery wrought with confusion. Courts have
been, and remain to be, perplexed as to how to reconcile the massive
data storage capabilities of contemporary electronic information systems
both with the traditional spoliation doctrine and within the parameters of
FRCP.24 8 The task of imposing sanctions in order to protect the integrity
of the American legal system, while simultaneously taking into
consideration the onerous burden that a duty to preserve potentially
relevant evidence in litigation may impose on a party is no doubt an
exceedingly difficult one, especially in light of the changes that
technology has bestowed on discovery.
Rule 37(e) was adopted into the FRCP as an attempted solution to
this quandary. 249 However, the Rule, as evidenced in its interpretation
and application, does no more than reiterate the policies behind the
245. Id. at 217.
246. Id. (noting that the preservation obligation attached because the "relevant people" were
aware of the possibility of litigation).
247. See Crist, supra note 29, at 43 (stating that the American justice system is based on the
idea that both sides have the ability of "obtaining and presenting relevant evidence").
248. See van Oostenrijk, supranote 157, at 1170-71.
249. Id. at 1168.
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traditional spoliation doctrine. 2 50 That being the case, Rule 37(e) should
be removed from the FRCP, and the traditional spoliation doctrine
should instead govern the imposition of these sanctions. In its place, a
reconfigured analysis of the aforementioned e-discovery problems must
take place. The focus must shift to effectuating a more standardized
statement of the point at which the duty of a party to preserve potentially
relevant evidence to litigation attaches. Once this is done, the problems
created when documents are inadvertently destroyed through the use of
electronic information systems will be lessened, and courts will be able
to take control of discovery, despite the enormous impact brought on by
technology.
Nicole D. Wright*
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